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1. Introduction 
The previous chapter has discussed the use of efficiency analysis tools to guide policy development 
and formulation.  While few readers will doubt that clear, consistent policy direction is necessary for 
the delivery of productivity improvements, it is not sufficient. To lead to action on the ground, policy 
interventions have to influence the behaviour of the staff who see and treat patients, and deliver 
public health and social care programmes. In this chapter, we discuss the challenges facing 
management as it seeks to use the analytic tools discussed elsewhere in this volume to secure 
efficiency improvements.   
It should be emphasised the environment of the working manager is very different from the 
environment of the policy maker, and even more so that of the academic researcher (Mintzberg, 
1976). Unlike academic researchers (at least those unburdened with management responsibilities), 
managers in general and in the health service in particular, typically describe a significant part of 
their time as being occupied with responding to sporadic, unanticipated and urgent problems, and 
filtering information, either through attending mostly irrelevant meetings or scrolling through a 
seemingly endless flow of emails so as to head off incipient crises.  Unlike policy makers, managers 
have relatively limited and weak levers for driving and securing change (e.g. they have to operate 
within the existing financial settlement, with institutions and staff facing incentives designed into 
their existing mandates and terms of employment).  Moreover, the elevated social status of medical 
professionals means that healthcare managers have more circumscribed authority than managers in 
most other industries. 
In short, with very limited time and capacity, managers have to make decisions about what evidence 
(if any) they look at and believe, what expertise they draw on, and how they search for solutions and 
present them in a persuasive way.  Efficiency analysis tools can have a role in this process if they are 
able to provide a plausible framework for interpretation, and can form an element in articulating the 
case for change.  For example, several authors have noted that frontier based methods (DEA and 
SFA) despite their popularity in academic circles, have received much less attention in the 
practitioner world, where the most popular efficiency analysis tools are episode and population 
costing systems (Hollingsworth and Street, 2006; Hussey et al, 2009).  It is plausible that what 
academics see as a strength of DEA, that it aggregates multiple inputs and outputs in a single 
efficiency measure, is, from a managerial point of view, a weakness, as it distracts attention from the 
question of where the problems actually lie, and where one should search for ideas for 
improvement.  
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In the first part of the chapter we present two frameworks which can help us understand how 
managers might think about evidence and solutions to efficiency problems in different settings.  Our 
first framework, Cynefin, is borrowed from knowledge management, and provides a perspective on 
the role of evidence in efficiency analysis; the second, grid-group theory, is drawn from the sociology 
of risk, and provides a perspective on the role of culture and ideology in the search for solutions.  In 
the second part of the chapter we will discuss how efficiency analysis can support three key tasks for 
managing the system.  We structure our discussion roughly using the classical Simonian tripartite 
classification of the stages of decision (Simon, 1977): intelligence, the stage in which one establishes 
that one has a problem; design, the stage in which one develops alternative  solutions; and choice, 
the stage at which on decides what solution to implement.  We review managerial tools which are 
available to support each of these activities and reflect on what the Cynefin and grid-group 
frameworks can tell us about how they are to be used. 
2. Who are managers ? 
In the general management literature, there have been several attempts to define  “ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?, 
ĨƌŽŵ ,ĞŶƌŝ &ĂǇŽů ?Ɛdescription of management as involving planning, organising, commanding, 
ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ DŝŶƚǌďĞƌŐ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ? ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ
decisional components of the manager ?s job ?ƚŽ^ƚĞǁĂƌƚ ?ƐĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬǁŚŝĐŚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐlooking at the 
managerial role in terms of its demands, its constraints and the choices which it affords 
(Wren,2005).  From a healthcare point of view, these definitions highlight that managers are 
typically not involved in primary production, ie treating and caring for the sick.  For this reason, 
managers can be controversial figures in healthcare systems: in the UK, governments regularly 
launch rhetoricĂů ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ ŽŶ  “ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚƐ ? ? ǁŚŝůĞ ůĂƵĚŝŶŐ  “ĨƌŽŶƚůŝŶĞ ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐ ? ? ĞǀĞŶ ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇ
create new regulatory responsibilities and structures.   
Even though healthcare managers do not enjoy the same generally positive public image as others in 
the medical workforce, they are present in all systems and recent evidence suggests that the quality 
of management is an important driver of system performance (Dorgan et al., 2010). Managers 
operate in different contexts and institutions, including purchasing organisations (e.g. regional 
healthcare authorities, sickness funds) or provider organisations (e.g. hospitals, physician networks). 
While the specific tasks will differ between contexts, we take the view that management is 
essentially about making decisions within the scope and remit which the manager enjoys through his 
position in the system hierarchy (Simon, 1977). Decision-making is, clearly, a process that is not 
exclusive to management. However, it is fundamental to any managerial role and independent of 
the context in which managers operate and so provides a useful frame which is independent of the 
specifics of any given managerial role (e.g. whether the manager is working in a hospital or in a 
purchasing organisation) ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ǁĞ ĨŽůůŽǁ ,ĞƌďĞƌƚ ^ŝŵŽŶ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĨĂŵŽƵƐ ŵŽĚĞů ǁŚŝĐŚ
distinguishes between three roles in the managerial decision-making process: intelligence, design, 
and choice. 
An ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?ƐũŽďŝŶŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ ?and indeed in other professional 
services) is that there parts of the production process which necessarily remain somewhat opaque 
to the manager.  Thus, while one would hope and expect that a modern manager in healthcare 
would typically have access to reasonably reliable and timely information about costs, throughput 
and quality, interpreting that information and determining what actions are implied can be less than 
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straightforward, compared to the case of simpler production facilities (Morton and Cornwell, 2009).  
This observation will be a theme of this chapter (of course we do not mean to suggest that it is not 
worthwhile improving the quality and availability of data, merely to observe that no database will 
ever be sufficiently comprehensive to settle all possible management-related questions decisively).   
It is important to realise that managers have a different, and specifically a narrower, view of 
efficiency than policy makers.  For both managers and policy makers, efficiency involves balancing 
inputs and outputs, but managers operate in a much more constrained environment.  The manager 
of a hospital or insurer has virtually no ability to control demand (typically the service is free at the 
point delivery, or user fees are heavily regulated), certainly in the short term; the technologies and 
services to be offered may be mandated by a centralised health technology assessment agency; the 
staffing levels may determined by an external professional body; payrates may be determined 
nationally through collective bargaining; a unionised and professional production staff may be 
extremely effective in resisting efforts to change work practices.  In a system where there is an 
institutional separation between purchasers and providers, managers on the purchasing side may 
seek to extract efficiencies by  “ƐŚŽƉƉŝŶŐĂƌŽƵŶĚ ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐŝƐŽŶůǇƉŽƐƐŝďůĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƌĞĂůǀĂƌŝĞƚǇ
in the provider market.  Considering all these constraints, it is remarkable that managers are able to 
find sufficient space for action to positively influence the delivery of services. 
 3.  Frameworks for analysis 
In this section, we present two frameworks which we will use in our subsequent discussion: the 
Cynefin framework from the area of knowledge management, and grid-group theory from the 
sociology of risk. 
3.1 Cynefin 
The Cynefin framework of Kurtz and Snowden (2003) - Cynefin (from a Welsh word roughly meaning 
 “ŚĂďŝƚĂƚ ? ?- is framework for sensemaking rooted in the field of knowledge management and can 
help to illustrate the challenges managers face in translating information into action. The Cynefin 
framework seeks to classify particular domains of action in terms of the possibilities for knowledge 
which that domain affords: as such it is particularly useful for clarifying what sort of guidance 
evidence can and cannot provide, and hence, how and when one might want to engage with 
experts.  Central to Cynefin as a framework are four domains: 
x The known domain in which cause and effect are understood, solid and unquestioned evidence 
exists and predictive modelling is possible; 
x The knowable domain in which cause and effect relationships exist but are not known, or not 
known widely. Knowledge could in principle be acquired in this domain but it would be costly 
and difficult to do so; 
x The complex domain in which events are one-off and causes and effects can be discerned 
retrospectively; 
x The chaotic domain in which causal mechanisms are unclear, even after the event 
Securing efficiency in the known domain is relatively straightforward: this is the domain where 
managers feel most comfortable. One can manage by ensuring that best practice is being followed 
and reviewing delayed discharges to make sure that internal discharge processes and 
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communication with providers who provide follow-up care are optimised. As one moves out of the 
known region, professional judgement becomes more important.  In the knowable domain what 
constitutes good practice is more contested, and so more room has to be made for local knowledge: 
identifying the causes of elevated readmission rates may require investigating practices in the 
community outset the formal healthcare system), arguing that this makes more sense for particular 
patients. In the complex domain, attempts to manage by compliance with standards are often 
experienced by those on the ground not only as constraining professional practice, but as part of a 
preemptive blame-shifting exercise in anticipation of things going wrong, which, inevitably, happens 
quite often  ? ŚĞŶĐĞ DƵŶƌŽ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĐĂůů ĨŽƌ Ă ĐŚŝůĚ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ “ǁŚŝĐŚ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů
ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ?(p7).  Lastly, in the chaotic domain, even the experts do not know what is going on. 
Prescribing generic antibiotics on a precautionary basis in an environment where access to testing 
facilities is limited and costly may seem to make sense on cost-effectiveness grounds  ? but it is 
precisely such actions which create drug resistant pathogens which in turn generate massive new 
illness and cost (Laxminarayan et al, 2013).  Where there is the possibility of chaotic behaviour, 
managers have to recognise that the problem is beyond their responsibility and outside help 
(fundamental scientific expertise, policy intervention) needs to be called on.  Ultimately such 
problems have to be tackled at a higher system level, but where the higher levels of this system fail 
to take appropriate action, it will be left to managers on the ground to pick up the pieces.       
3.2 Grid-group theory 
Grid-group theory, a model of culture popular in the sociology of risk (Thompson et al, 1990), can be 
ĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽŚĞĂůƚŚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƚŽŐĂŝŶĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐĂƐƚŽŚŽǁŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?Ɛ individual views of the way in 
which the health system works and their place within it.  It is useful because it provides a frame for 
explaining the sort of ideology which people use when conceptualising solutions to efficiency 
problems.  Grid-group theory is based on a 2x2 classification system: the two dimensions are the 
extent to which an individual iĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐǁŝƚŚĂ ůĂƌŐĞƌƐŽĐŝĂůƵŶŝƚ  ? “ŐƌŽƵƉ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĐŚŽŝĐĞŝƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚĂƐďĞŝŶŐĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚďǇĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐ ? “ŐƌŝĚ ? ? ? 
Individuals inhabiting each of the four cells of the matrix are referred to as: 
x Individualists (low grid, low group).  People in this cell view do not identify strongly with larger 
groups and reject external constraints. They see relationships as expedient and subject to 
negotiation.  Their natural form of social organisation is the market. 
x Egalitarians (low grid, high group).  People in this cell identify strongly with others but reject 
external constraints. They view relationships as intrinsically important but reject status 
distinctions.  Their natural form of social organisation is the commune. 
x Hierarchists (high grid, high group).  People in this cell identify strongly with others and accept 
external constraints.  They view both relationships and social roles as important.  Their natural 
form of social organisation is the bureaucracy. 
x Fatalists (high grid, low group).  People in this cell experience social constraints but do not 
identify with larger groups.  For them, the world is arbitrary and relationships are problematic 
and frustrating.  Their natural form of social organisation is the prison. 
To see how this might be relevant in an organisation seeking to make efficiency improvements, 
consider the case of a surgical department of a hospital which has been experiencing cost overruns.  
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What sort of solutions might first come to mind to the responsible manager?  dŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝƐƚ ?Ɛ
preferred solution is to actively use performance incentive payments to increase surgical 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƉƵƚ PŝĨƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬŚĞǁŝůůŽƵƚƐŽƵƌĐĞĚŝĂŐŶŽƐƚŝĐƐ ?Such solutions require the ability to 
benchmark externally  ? to know whether incentive payments will increase output or whether 
outsourcing will improve results, it would be helpful to know what the performance of other 
comparable institutions is. The egalitarian wonders why so many patients show up in such poor 
shape and have such weak support networks that they often have to be readmitted shortly after 
discharge.  She advocates an asset-based approach to build individual and community capacity, and 
thus to manage demand. This line of reasoning leads one to require broader information about the 
patient journey between different care providers, and thus the ability to link data across multiple 
care encounters.  The hierarchist just wants to make sure that everyone is doing their job and 
following best practice. He carefully studies the guidelines and launches a new round of clinical 
audit.  This presupposes that good quality clinical guidance has been produced at the centre (and 
costed to ensure that it is actually deliverable).  The fatalist responds by fiddling the figures, 
reasoning that this is what everyone else does anyway. 
4. Managerial Roles for efficiency analysis in intelligence, design and choice  
The following section considers the different roles managers need to adopt in order to ensure 
efficiency improvements, while also considering the tools available to assist them in these roles as 
well as the challenges they may face in implementing them. In the view of this chapter, management 
consists, essentially, of making decisions  ? depending on the context, these may be decisions about 
the structure of service delivery or about the allocation of healthcare staff, for instance. Following 
Herbert Simon (1977), managerial decision-making in a context of health system efficiency involves 
three fundamental roles: (1) the diagnosis of an efficiency problem; (2) the design of a solution; and 
(3) the choice of the appropriate response.  
4.1. Intelligence: diagnosing the efficiency problem  
 
Before thinking about solutions to efficiency problems, the logical first step is to diagnose where the 
problems lie  ? this is the intelligence phase.  Ŷ  ‘ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ŝŶ ŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ
could take two forms: perceived excessive costs for the observed level of output (or, conversely, 
ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ƵŶĚĞƌƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ Ă ŐŝǀĞŶ ůĞǀĞůŽĨ ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? ? ĂŶĚ Ă  ‘ǁƌŽŶŐ ? ŵŝǆ of outputs produced 
(reflecting problems of technical and allocative efficiency, respectively, see Chapter 1.2). From a 
managerial perspective, the promise of efficiency measurement lies in its potential to point towards 
areas of concern and thus enable further targeted analysis and action. 
 
Managers may discover that they have an efficiency problem through either what one might think of 
as external or internal avenues: they may be told by some powerful stakeholder that they have to 
improve efficiency (while being given the same or less money) or there may be exogenous shock 
(like an epidemic) which results in a spike in demand or resource consumption, requiring efficiency 
improvements if the system is to be kept in financial balance.  Alternatively, they may discover 
efficiency problems through internal monitoring of their own performance.  As the second avenue 
relates to actions which are within management control, we focus in this chapter on the internal 
monitoring route to problem discovery.  One would expect that the better an organisation is at 
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internal monitoring, the more able it will be to predict and respond to efficiency problems which are 
forced on it by external parties or events.  
 
In this section we discuss what efficiency measures, such as variations in clinical practice and 
outcomes can support managers in identifying ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ‘ŚĂǀĞĂƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ? In a systematic review of 
efficiency measures, Hussey et al. (2009) find that most measures that are actually used by health 
service managers consist of ratios, based on single metrics for inputs and outputs. An example of a 
ratio-based measure is severity-adjusted average length of hospital stay (the ratio of total days of 
hospital care to discharges, adjusted for patient severity). A popular approach to use such measures 
is to assemble them in dashboards. These business tools colour-code trends for instance in red 
(reflecting poor or worsening efficiency which requires priority attention), amber (reflecting poor or 
worsening efficiency which requires close monitoring) and green (reflecting adequate levels of 
efficiency). However, key challenges lie in the subjective choice about the level of efficiency that is 
interpreted as requiring immediate attention, as opposed to continued monitoring only. 
 
Econometric or mathematical programming methodologies such as SFA and DEA, respectively, which 
have generated much academic research (Hollingsworth and Street, 2006) are hardly used by 
practising managers (Hussey et al., 2009). While these approaches allow for the analysis of multiple 
metrics of inputs, outputs, and explanatory variables, which are aggregated into a single number of 
system or organisational efficiency, they tend to require controversial methodological choices in 
particular about the sets of weights used to combine multiple metrics into a single composite 
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ?'ŽĚĚĂƌĚĂŶĚ:ĂĐŽďƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐƐƵĐŚĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚĞŵĞƚƌŝĐƐƚƌĞĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂůƚŚƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƐĂ “ďůĂĐŬ
ďŽǆ ?ĂŶĚĚŽŶŽƚƉŝŶƉŽŝŶƚƚŚĞƉƌĞĐŝƐĞĂƌĞĂƐǁŚĞƌĞƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐŶĞĞĚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞǇƚĞnd to have 
limited relevance for managers who must design and choose between specific actions to be taken. 
An emerging alternative to this, however, is the use of ratio-based efficiency analysis (REA; Salo and 
Punkka, 2009). Rather than forcedly assigning a single efficiency rank to each entity studied, this 
method enables the generation of ranking intervals and dominance relations. REA thus provides 
managers with a transparent indication of uncertainty about their ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛrelative position 
and about the degree to which action is warranted (Schang et al., 2015). 
 
In some health systems, applying external pressure for action to improve efficiency has been 
pursued in the form of public reporting of measures of efficiency. A pertinent example at the system 
level is the   the analysis of geographic variations in health system performance, promoted especially 
by John Wennberg and colleagues in the U.S. and increasingly also by governments and academic 
institutions in several European countries including the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and 
Spain, as well as other OECD countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
3
 This research 
has shown persistent variations in health outcomes, activity and expenditure across geographic 
regions and healthcare providers {for a systematic review see \Corallo, 2014 #13514}. Many of the 
indicators used can be interpreted as partial measures of efficiency, as they focus, for instance, on 
rates of avoidable hospital admissions. The underlying rationale, from a health system efficiency 
perspective, is that resources are misallocated as patients consume expensive hospital care although 
high-quality primary care might have prevented the admission in the first place. When multiple 
measures of variation in cost and outcomes are put together, the analysis of variations can be 
                                                          
3
 For more information, see http://wennbergcollaborative.org/index.php 
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understood as a form of benchmarking {for an extended discussion of benchmarking in healthcare`, 
see \Neely, 2013 #13078}: if comparable regions seem to have better outcomes (lower costs) for a 
given level of spending (output), then there may be scope in the other regions to release resources 
to be invested in areas of higher-value care.  
 
To provide useful information for local managers working in a time-pressured environment, 
evidence of variations needs to be translated into tools that can relatively quickly and easily be 
applied by users without advanced levels of statistical knowledge, such as in the form of visual aids. 
An example from England are Spend-and-Outcome-Tools (SPOTs) which adapt the familiar idea of 
cost-effectiveness analysis planes, often used in health technology assessment, for system-level 
analyses. SPOTs plot a local health economy ?Ɛoutcomes against costs in specific areas (e.g. cancer, 
circulatory diseases, mental health) relative to other local health systems. Positions in the 
South/East quadrant (higher cost/ worse outcome) can provide a strong case for further inquiry and 
action to move closer to the better-performing systems. Positions in the North/East (higher 
cost/better outcome) and South/West (lower cost/worse outcome) quadrants may reflect, but also 
provoke a reconsideration of, current priorities for investment for instance through a more detailed 
priority-setting exercise (see section 4.3) focused on the relative value gained from different 
interventions in these areas.   An indicative SPOT display for a fictional public health programme is 
shown in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1.  SPOT display for a fictional public health programme 
 
 
In practice, however, many hurdles need to be overcome before such tools can be used by health 
service managers. Our evaluation of the NHS Atlas of Variation in England {Schang, 2014 #4436} 
highlighted the following practical challenges: (i) many managers were simply not aware of this 
information, despite it being distributed as a paper copy to all Chief Executives and Directors of 
Public Health; (ii) information was sometimes not accepted as valid due to known measurement and 
coding issues; (iii) there were doubts over perceived applicability of the data in providing a rounded 
picture of performance; (iv) some organisations were not able to use the information due to capacity 
constraints or because ƚŚĞŶĞǆƚǇĞĂƌ ?ƐƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŚĂĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶĂŐƌĞĞĚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐŚĂĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇ
been signed when the data were published.  
 
In terms of Cynefin, when thinking about the efficiency metrics available to managers, some 
information will fall into the known domain, such as cost-ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ďĂĚ ?ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞĐĂŶďĞ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŵŽƐƚefficiency metrics fall within the knowable or 
complex domains. In these domains, performance indicators are likely to represent what Carter and 
al {, 1995 #213} termed  ‘ƚŝŶŽƉĞŶĞƌs ? ?in themselves inaccurate pictures of performance, but useful 
triggers for  further investigation to clarify causes and consequences  ? rather than  ‘ĚŝĂůs ?  ?good 
measures that can be judged against normative standards. For instance, when comparing rates of 
hip replacement across regions, much more detailed analysis at provider and patient levels of 
Low spend, worse outcome 
Low spend, better outcome High spend, better outcome 
High spend, worse  outcome 
 9 
 
analysis is required to examine to what extent higher rates of surgery reflect comparative 
inefficiency rather than valued activities justifiable by, say, higher levels of medical need or patient 
preferences. Diagnosing problems simply in terms of the empirical distribution of performance thus 
can be problematic  ? ŝƚŝŐŶŽƌĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ďĞƐƚ ?ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞis not always known or knowable, and that 
even organisations leading the top-end of the distribution may have substantial scope for 
improvement. 
 
 
 
The grid-group framework can also provide a perspective on how different healthcare systems 
assign a different locus of ownership to managerial tools for problem diagnosis. For example, the 
English Atlas of Variation is clearly targeted at managers and clinicians within established 
organisations in charge of allocating resources for healthcare across sectors, thus reflecting a more 
hierarchist view of diagnosing problems and searching for solutions. In contrast, in Germany, in the 
absence of an institution with cross-sectorial responsibility for health system planning {Ettelt, 2012 
#8119}, attempts to disseminate information on variations have taken a more individualist 
perspective by targeting patients and consumers of health services {Nolting, 2011 #652} with a view 
to empowering them to question advice given to them by medical professionals. However, for 
moving beyond problem diagnosis towards leading change, a stronger  “ŐƌŽƵƉ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ
coordinated action between different stakeholders may be helpful (see Box 1). {Nuti, 2014 #15367} 
Box 1. Managing system efficiency in Italian regions (Nuti and Seghieri. 2014).) 
Years of experience in performance management at a regional level in Italy suggest that the strong 
focus on regular discussion between managers from different regions and academic researchers, 
combined with tangible incentives such as linking parts of ChieĨ ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐ ? ƌĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ
performance outcomes, were key elements in sustaining commitment to change. Starting in 2004, 
the Tuscany regional health authority entrusted the Laboratorio Management e Sanità of Scuola 
^ƵƉĞƌŝŽƌĞ^ĂŶƚ ?ŶŶĂ (MeS Lab) to design a multi-dimensional performance evaluation system which 
includes indicators of both elements of the efficiency equation (outputs and financial sustainability). 
Indicators are selected through an interaction process between the MeS Lab research team and the 
regional representatives. To provide decision support for each healthcare provider, results are 
discussed in systematic and consensus-based meetings between top management and regional 
administrators every three months. Starting in 2006, performance results are also linked to the 
remuneration of chief executives. Combined with a the striking visual repŽƌƚŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƚŚĞ “ƚĂƌŐĞƚ ?
diagram) which highlights multi-dimensional aspects of performance and the public disclosure of the 
performance results, the Tuscan system has been demonstrated to successfully improve overall 
regional performance and has been adapted to other Italian regions. 
 
4.2. Design: Process improvement methodologies 
Having diagnosed an efficiency problem, the next stage is to design solutions, typically involving 
some form of service reconfiguration ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂƌĞĂ ŽĨ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ.  
Operations management concepts drawn from philosophies sƵĐŚĂƐ “ůĞĂŶƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?, six sigma, Total 
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Quality Management and the like are often promoted as providing guidance on how to reconfigure 
services to improve patient flow, and thus simultaneously reduce cost and drive up quality (Vissers 
and Beech, 2005; Ronen and Pliskin, 2006; Hopp and Lovejoy, 2013).  A critical idea behind these 
improvement philosophies is to concentrate on optimising processes and flows of patients along 
these processes rather than optimising single isolated steps.  For example, one operations 
management principle is to focus on the bottleneck activities in the process, as it is these which 
constrain throughput and driving waiting times  ? this is Change Number 8 of the Modernisation 
ŐĞŶĐǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? “ ? ?,ŝŐŚ/ŵƉĂĐƚŚĂŶŐĞƐ ?.    
Several stories of the transformative power of these concepts exist  ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽůƚŽŶ ?Ɛlean 
transformation of its trauma service (Fillingham, 2007) or ƚŚĞ 'ůĂƐŐŽǁ ZŽǇĂů /ŶĨŝƌŵĂƌǇ ?Ɛ
reengineered fracture clinic (Vardy et al, 2013)  ? see Box 2 below for a description of the latter.  The 
message which comes across clearly from these accounts, as well as the broader academic literature 
(Waring and Bishop, 2010, Radnor et al, 2012), is that these concepts, while potentially powerful, are 
ŶŽƚ  “ƉůƵŐĂŶĚƉůĂǇ ?  ? to realise benefits requires deep engagement with the concepts, significant 
expertise about the idiosyncrasies of the local process and the strategic vision and communication 
skills to build a case for change and sell it to an often sceptical audience.   
Box 2.  Fracture clinic redesign at Glasgow Royal Infirmary (Vardy et al, 2013; Jenkins et al, 
forthcoming) 
In 2010, Glasgow Royal Infirmary introduced a new set of procedures for the management of 
undisplaced ĨĂĐƚƵƌĞƐ ? ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ƚŽ ĂƐ Ă  “sŝƌƚƵĂů ? &ƌĂĐƚƵƌĞ ůŝŶŝĐ.  The overall concept was to  
standardise patient care for orthopaedic trauma outpatients. This involved the  development of 
protocols for potentially dischargeable injuries and agreement about which patients could self-care. 
Before the implementation of the new process, patients arriving at the Emergency Department 
would have their fractures immobilised with a plaster slab and would have to return for an 
outpatient appointment to have the slab removed.  Subsequent to the implementation of the new 
procedure, some patients would receive a removable splint in the Emergency Department together 
with a leaflet giving instructions on self-care. Those with potentially dischargeable injuries would be 
directly discharged from ED.  All other patient records would be reviewed at a virtual clinic (without 
patients in attendance) on a daily basis with a consultant and nurse. All patients are then called by 
the nurse and either given an appointment to be seen or given further advice on self-care. Around 
30% of the initial cohort of patients at ED need to be seen at an outpatient appointment. All 
orthopaedic trauma patients have access to a hotline number which they can call for further advice. 
Patient satisfaction with the new process is reported as good, with no additional burden on 
Emergency Departments.  The implementation of the new process has helped the orthopaedic 
Department of the Glasgow Royal Infirmary contain cost growth at a time of increasing financial 
stress on the healthcare system.   
A different approach to improve efficiency in health service operations is shared decision making. 
This approach has emerged in response to evidence of wide variations in the provision of so-called 
preference-ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞ ĐĂƌĞ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ďĞƐƚ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ĚĞƉĞŶĚƐ ŽŶ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ŽǀĞƌ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ?
harms and scientific uncertainties associated with each option {O'Connor A, 2004 #695}. Since 
doctors or scientific committees do not know these preferences {Folland, 1990 #8281}, shared 
decision making seeks to involve patients in the decision-making process. For example, in treatment 
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for osteoarthritis, hip replacement surgery is but one of many other medical, pharmaceutical and 
physiotherapeutic options and shared decision making would seek to communicate the range of 
options and help patients clarify their personal preferences such that the best strategy can be 
agreed on.  Among the benefits which are claimed to flow from the implementation of shared 
decision making are improvements in allocative efficiency, that is to say, before producing outputs, 
one verifies that these outputs are actually valued by the intended beneficiary.  In the case of Benign 
Prostatic Hyperplasia (BPH), for example, experiences show that many patients who are fully 
informed of the likely consequences, good and bad, of different treatment modes, elect not to have 
surgery (Wennberg, 2010).  
 
Implementation of shared decision making has tended to follow two routes:  reforming education 
and training systems for health professionals, and empowering patients to become more reflective 
of their personal preferences. To streamline the process, patient decision aids (PDAs) have been 
developed for use before or during clinical consultations in order to guide patients through a 
structured package of information about options, questions about personal values and trade-offs.
4
 
According to a recent Cochrane review, PDAs consistently improve patient knowledge of options and 
outcomes, and enable more accurate perceptions of outcome probabilities when compared to usual 
care (Stacey et al, 2011). In practice, however, perceived time constraints remain the most 
commonly reported barrier among health professionals to their widespread implementation (Légaré 
et al, 2008). This is particularly challenging since PDAs appear to have a variable effect on the time 
required for consultations  ? when patients prepare using a decision aid, this can shorten but also 
lengthen subsequent consultations (Stacey et al, 2011). Although strides have been made towards 
shared decision making in cultural and organisational contexts as diverse as the US, the UK, Canada, 
Germany, Norway and China (Légaré et al, 2008), available studies show that professionals 
frequently question the applicability of PDAs to meet the needs of their populations and that 
progress hinges on the willingness of both patients and professionals to engage in the process 
(Stacey et al, 2011). 
4.3 Choice: Priority setting and resource allocation 
dŚĞ ƚĞƌŵƐ  “ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ  “ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ?W^Z ?ŽĨƚĞŶƵƐĞĚ ŝŶŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ ƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ
the activity of deciding what to do  ? what treatments should be funded, what service 
reconfigurations to be undertaken and so on.  (The somewhat more dramatiĐ ǁŽƌĚ  “ƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ? ŝƐ
sometimes also used).  PSRA represents a natural follow-up activity to performance measurement 
and the design of service reconfigurations: if performance measurement represents the 
 “ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?ƉŚĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ, and lean and shared decision making have an 
important role in generating ideas about how services might be reconfigured,  then PSRA represents 
ƚŚĞ  “ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ƉŚĂƐĞƐ, where decisions about what service improvements to implement are actually 
made.  For example ?ŝŶƚŚĞ “ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?ƉŚĂƐĞ ?ǇŽƵŵŝŐŚƚƌĞĂůŝƐĞƚŚĂƚǇŽƵŚĂǀĞ efficiency problems 
in your diabetes and childhood mental health services; in the design phase, you might work out and 
cost strategies for addressing these problems through service reconfiguration; and then in the 
choice phase, you might decide which of these two clinical areas to target. 
                                                          
4
 A range of PDAs for chronic and non-urgent conditions can be accessed for example via the website of the 
Ottawa Hospital Research Institute: https://decisionaid.ohri.ca/AZlist.html 
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PSRA has become increasingly well-established in many jurisdictions at the policy level in many 
European countries, through health technology assessment agencies like NICE in England, the 
Scottish Medicines Consortium in Scotland, the Haute Autorité de Santé in France, IQWiG in 
Germany and so on.  Such agencies typically draw more or less explicitly on the ideas of economic 
evaluation presented in Drummond et al (2005) and Gold (1996), based around trading off health 
gain, captured in QALYs, against cost.  A variant of the economic evaluation approach, Generalised 
Cost Effectiveness Analysis (GCEA), has been promoted by the WHO and has received some 
attention in developing countries (Tan-Torres Edejer et al, 2003). 
Even in jurisdictions like England where is a strong central health technology assessment agency, 
there is still considerable scope for decision making at the local management level.  This may be 
because there is as yet no published policy on guidance on some particular technologies which the 
local provider wishes to use or because some of the options which are being considered are not the 
sort of things which are susceptible to health technology assessment (eg closure of a small, 
inefficient and unsafe but popular A&E). Alternatively it could be because local circumstances mean 
that because the assumptions about cost or population health underpinning published policy level 
technology assessments do not apply locally (e.g. the ethnic mix means that the local population has 
a high prevalence of sickle cell anemia, making it cost-effective to invest in specialised services; 
providing a small island-based population with timely access to CT scan may not be cost-effective, 
making it problematic to offer thrombolysis as a treatment for ischaemic stroke).  
dŚĞ ĐůŽƐĞƐƚ ƚŚŝŶŐ ƚŽ Ă ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞ ĨŽƌ WZ^ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ůŽĐĂů ůĞǀĞů ŝƐ  “WƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ƵĚŐĞƚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ
DĂƌŐŝŶĂůŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ŽƌWD (Mitton and Donaldson, 2004; Peacock et al, 2010).  Accounts of PBMA 
emphasise that PRSA involves providing both a modelling framework for eliciting and organising 
judgements about the reasons for doing different treatments, and process ground rules.  For 
example, Multicriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA), in which stakeholders are invited to score the 
performance of packages of activity against various objectives, is often presented as a practical and 
accessible modelling framework, which is simpler and more flexible than full-scale health economic 
modelling (see e.g. Peacock, et al, 2007 or Wilson et al, 2006 for examples).  In a similar way, the 
Accountability for Reasonableness framework (a collection of principles relating to transparency, 
relevance of argumentation and openness to appeals) is often presented as a process model (Daniels 
and Sabin, 2008). 
Recently, work sponsored by the Health Foundation and involving the authors has taken a somewhat 
different approach from the standard PBMA paradigm (Airoldi and Morton, 2011; Airoldi, 2013; 
Airoldi et al, 2014).  The proponents of the STAR approach share the view of the advocates of PBMA 
that providing decision support has a substantive and a process component (indeed the name STAR 
ƐƚĂŶĚƐĨŽƌ “^ŽĐŝŽ-Technical Allocation ŽĨZĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?). The philosophy behind the STAR approach is 
that the analysis framework of health economics with its focus on monetary cost and individual 
health benefits provides the soundest and most compelling framework for resource allocation for 
population health.  Recognising the way that this modelling framework is used at the policy level for 
national health technology assessment decisions is far too complex, costly and demanding of 
specialised skill to implement at the local level, STAR provides a parsimonious health economics 
model which can serve as a framework for organising locally available evidence, expert assessments 
and value judgements (see Box 3.).   
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Box 3.  STAR for healthcare purchasers and clinical experts (Airoldi, 2013; Airoldi et al, 2014; 
IMPRESS, 2012) 
STAR (Socio-Technical Allocation of Resources) refers to an approach to healthcare prioritisation 
based on a concept of decision making as having both a social and a technical dimension in the spirit 
of Phillips and Bana e Costa (2007) ?ƚƚŚĞĐŽƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ^dZĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂƌĞ “ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ? ?
facilitated participative modelling workshops, where participants representing diverse viewpoints 
and interests in the system  ? managers, hospital doctors, general practitioners, nurses and allied 
health professionals, finance and public health specialists, and patient representatives  ? are guided 
through a set of structured assessment of population level costs and benefits associated with 
particular courses of action.  The philosophy of STAR is that while clinical is evidence is critical to 
making decisions, decisions never drop out of analysis  ? decisions must ultimately be taken on the 
basis expert judgements of facts and values.  Thus, while STAR workshops rely on preparatory data 
gathering, which is tabled at the workshop, the process stresses visual interactive tools to help all 
workshop participants understand both the scale of costs and benefits associated with particular 
options on the table, and the efficiency or  “ďĂŶŐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ďƵĐŬ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?  ^dZ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ
deployed in several Primary Care Trusts in England (as the commissioning organisations were called 
at the time) with documented stories of impact in Isle of Wight and Sheffield.  STAR was also used 
the clinical expert group IMPRESS to arrive at commissioning guidelines for COPD  ? these guidelines 
were glowingly reviewed in the BMJ by Gray and El-dƵƌĂďŝ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚŽƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ “ The tool used by 
/DWZ^^ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂĚŽpted and adapted by all clinical communities of practice to estimate and 
visualise the marginal benefits of all aspects of care for the benefit of patients. ? 
Since as we have noted above, different healthcare activities are located in different domains of the 
Cynefin spectrum, one might expect that the differing nature of the evidence base between eg 
public health interventions (more knowable) than surgical interventions (more known) would 
present a challenge to would be priority setters.  In our experience this is indeed a salient feature of 
the management of PRSA. A common concern heard from Directors of Public Health is that they 
believe that rebalancing their portfolio towards the preventive and away from the acute side is the 
right thing to do for their local population  ? but the evidence is all for the acute interventions.  
Indeed, one of the strengths of the STAR approach, which recognises the validity of expert 
judgement as an input, is that it enables a discussion of the relative merits of acute versus 
preventive interventions within a common framework. 
Grid-group theory also offers an interesting perspective on priority setting.  Most PSRA methods, as 
ŶŽƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?ŚĂǀĞĂƐƚƌŽŶŐ “ŐƌŽƵƉ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ PƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŝŶƚĞŶĚ ĚĂƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚory frameworks.  How 
far that participation extends, however, varies from application to application.  For example, the 
main workshop event in the application reported in Airoldi et al (2014) involved twenty five 
stakeholders: the eight executive directors of the health authority, nine commissioning managers, 
three patient and public representatives, four clinical experts and one representative of social 
services.  In another application, the group members were all members of a clinical expert group 
(IMPRESS) who wished to issue commissioning guidance on COPD (IMPRESS, 2012).  Grid-group 
theory highlights that how intense participation is and what constituencies are included will be 
culturally driven and culturally dependent.    
5.  Recommendations for practice 
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In this section we give some examples of tasks which might face managers tasked with achieving 
efficiency improvements, and reflect on how the frameworks which we have presented above might 
give insight into how to go about these tasks. 
5. 1 Task 1.  Designing a set of efficiency indicators  
Efficiency indicators should be designed with a view in mind of the extent to which the aspects of 
efficiency measured are under the control of the organisation being assessed.  As the Cynefin 
framework suggests, if a performance measurement framework contains a small number of 
efficiency measures where the causal links between action and performance are clear, this may 
stimulate the evaluated organisation to identify efficiency improvements through redesigning 
processes; however if many indicators are not of this type, then the risk is that managers in the 
organisation will be overwhelmed by the resulting ambiguity.  This may result in unintended and 
unproductive effects such as cynicism and gaming.  
Following from this, a key insight offered by grid/ group theory is that if efficiency indicators are to 
be used to drive performance improvements, this should be done in a way which is appropriate with 
the prevailing culture.  To enable low-grid managers, that is managers who feel constrained by 
external factors  ? for example because they feel that a poor efficiency metric is capturing a factor 
outside their control (such as poor hospital outcomes reflecting patient lifestyles) -  processes should 
be put in place for managers to communicate these concerns to other stakeholders and to policy 
makers. This in turn should feedback to an improvement in the measurement and monitoring 
frameworks in place at both organizational and system levels.  
Grid-group theory can also provide us with some insights regarding the best types of incentives likely 
to work in organizations, or to incentivize the management of organizations. In low group settings, 
that is when managers do not identify as part of the larger health system, performance management 
systems which rely heavily on extrinsic motivators such as targets or financial rewards may be 
appropriate.  On the other hand, in high group settings, where managers view themselves as part of 
a wider system the danger is that such motivators may undermine intrinsic motivation and engender 
cynicism and game playing, and so a more developmental approach may be appropriate.  Of course, 
the use of extrinsic versus intrinsic motivators may be implemented in a deliberate attempt to 
change culture, but managers who do so should be mindful that both high and low group cultures 
are viable and can support high performance in the right circumstances. 
5.2 Task 2. Using analytic methods to identify process improvements 
In some cases, the process improvements which can support greater efficiency may be obvious: 
reducing unnecessary diagnostic tests and substituting generic for branded pharmaceuticals are 
simple and easy to implement.  However, often in healthcare, quite detailed investigations (clinical 
trials, detailed costing or simulation studies) are needed to establish whether one intervention is 
more cost effective than another. Moreover, it may be difficult to pinpoint sources of inefficacy in 
systems that are quite complex and fragmented. For example, it may be that a very efficient hospital 
exists within a very inefficient health system. While the hospital itself may be providing the best 
treatment with the resources it has, outcomes may not appear good because of inefficiencies 
elsewhere in the system (such as poor prevention for example).  
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The Cynefin framework recognizes this complexity  ? some causal connections between action and 
outcome are obvious and it requires only minimal action to decide what to do, whereas in other 
settings the linkage is less clear and significant investigative work may be required.  Moreover, 
Cynefin reminds us that there are limits to what can be achieved by analysis.  For example, in an 
environment without good diagnostic coding or data linking, it may be simply impossible to know 
whether introducing a management programme in primary care for adults with respiratory problems 
such as COPD or asthma does actually reduce emergency admissions. The existence of these limits of 
analysis highlights that management operates in an environment which is significantly constrained 
by policy choices, and sometimes the most appropriate action  ? indeed the only possible response 
with any chance of effectively addressing the problem  ? may be to escalate the problem to a higher 
system level.  
Equally, grid group theory highlights the importance of cultural fit when analytic methods are used 
as a tool of communication and persuasion.  Analytic methods by their nature are somewhat 
opaque: accepting conclusions which flow from such methods requires taking on trust that the 
method has been implements competently and in good faith.  High grid cultures, where managers 
feel they are constrained by external factors will deal with this by having standards and checklists for 
analysis (such as the checklists for economic evaluation which currently seem popular).  In high 
group cultures on the other hand, the focus will be on the personal standing of the analyst. In 
cultures which are neither high grid or high group, if analytic methods can be used as a tool of 
persuasion, the modelling methods chosen will have to be very accessible (e.g. painstaking 
documentation, visual interactive displays to communicate the model structure and workings) and 
people whose behaviour is to be changed will have to be given the time and opportunity to study 
and convince themselves, if change efforts are to have any chance of being successful. So the 
appropriate choice of analytic method depends on careful attention to what is considered as 
persuasive by the stakeholders who bear responsibility for implementing any resultant action. 
5.3. Task 3.  Engaging stakeholders in decision making 
Cynefin highlights the importance of thinking through why one wants to involve stakeholders in 
decision making.  In some environments, where causes are known and straightforward, involvement 
of stakeholders might be essentially a communication campaign: in this case involvement could be 
relatively light touch.  In other environments, where causes are unknown or knowable, involving 
stakeholders could be a good way to get a better understanding of causal relationships  ? particularly 
where relationships are not captured in data.  In the rare case where the environment is genuinely 
chaotic, all that one can reasonably hope for from the involvement of stakeholders may be that this 
kickstarts the process of sensemaking, as problems involving chaotic systems cannot, in the 
ŵĞŵŽƌĂďůĞƋƵŽƚĞŽĨŝŶƐƚĞŝŶ ? “ďĞƐŽůǀĞĚĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞůĞǀĞůŽĨƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚƚŚĞŵ ? ?
Grid/ Group theory also offers potentially useful insights into the question of how intensively to 
involve stakeholders in decision making.  Fatalistic stakeholders will not participate usefully in 
engagement, unless they can be transformed into stakeholders of some other type.  Individualistic 
stakeholders may participate in engagement but must be managed  ? the danger is that such 
stakeholders will never be able to step out of their role as lobbyists for special interests.  In 
hierarchist and egalitarian cultures there will be different expectations about who should be 
included and involved: hierarchists will be happy with a decision in which those with relevant 
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expertise and formal leadership roles have been consulted, whereas egalitarians will want to see 
evidence that the process includes those who are most likely to be affected by the decision on the 
ground, including grassroots staff and patients. 
5.4  Task 4.  Communicating recommendations through guidelines and protocols  
An important idea in Cynefin is that not all knowledge claims are equal: it is now a commonly 
accepted principle in guideline development that guidelines should include some indication of the 
strength of the evidence underpinning a particular recommendation, so that those charged with 
implementing guidance can make a properly sensitive and contextualised judgement about whether 
to follow a particular piece of recommendation.  Initiatives like GRADE (Guyatt et al., 2008) are 
important precisely because the development of a standard system for communicating the strength 
of evidence behind a guideline are vital is busy clinicians (and managers) are to be able to quickly 
form an impression of how unconditional and binding (or how tentative and provisional) they should 
take a particular recommendation to be. 
Similarly Grid/ group theory highlights that in cultural terms, guidelines rely on implicit culture which 
is, at least to some extent hierarchist: for guidelines to be accepted, readers must accept that the 
guideline writers are offering legitimate and well-founded advice.  To some extent, this hierarchism 
is inculcated into the medical profession through the process of professional education.  However, 
there is also a significant individualist strand within medicine as well, and in different places and 
different specialties the balance will be struck differently.  Grid/ group theory thus highlights the 
importance to being sensitive to such cultural differences, and not to assume that guidelines will be 
everywhere enthusiastically accepted.  
6. Conclusion  
A theme of this chapter has been that the use of efficiency analysis in the management setting has 
to be understood, as the Cynefin framework suggests, in terms of the affordances of the 
underpinning evidence  ? in some domains of healthcare cause-effect relationships are clear, but in 
others this is less the case. Often there is good compelling evidence for efficiency improvement 
which speaks for itself but it is in the (common) situations where this is not the case that 
management judgement has to be brought to bear. It should be stressed that while science can wait 
until the evidence is in before coming to a conclusion, and while policy makers can commission 
evidence reviews and hire experts, neither of these options are available to a manager who will face 
her Board on Friday and is expected to present recommendations for action. 
Another theme has been that that the cultural context of management determines how efficiency 
analysis tools are used, as highlighted by grid-group theory.  This prevailing culture may be 
influenced by national institutional structures: for example one might speculate that NHS-like 
systems with centralised lines of control and salaried health professionals may lead managers to 
think and act in more hierarchist and bureaucratic ways, while managers working in systems with 
independent and self-employed professionals may be more naturally inclined to adopt market-based 
or individualist solutions.  At the policy level, decision makers may have access to enough of levers of 
power to believe that they can transform organisational culture: managers on the other hand must, 
to a much greater extent, work within the straitjacket which culture imposes.  
 17 
 
Insofar as neither the evidence base not the prevailing culture can be changed, our argument leads 
to the conclusion that to be usable and used, efficiency analysis tools have to fit with both that 
evidence base and cultural context: that is, they have to suggest or evoke arguments which are 
plausible in the light of the evidence, for solutions which are culturally acceptable.  Although some 
tools explicitly and sometimes successfully seek to transform existing culture  ? e.g. by building on 
ideas from other industries  ? it is likely that managers will need some prior common ground to 
anchor these ideas. Moreover, our argument suggests that it is not enough to have a technical 
modelling tool (Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Multicriteria Decision Analysis), but one also has to have 
a process account of how such a tool can be used  ? how should supporting evidence be generated 
and whom should be involved in the interpretation of results and search for solutions. 
The need to improve efficiency in healthcare  ? i.e. to get more benefit for patients and populations 
with less resources  ? is going to sorely test health services in coming years.  The tools and concepts 
of efficiency analysis have a part to play but managers have to engage with them in a way where 
they are realistic and sensitive to what these tools can and cannot offer, and whether they are able 
to do this will have a huge influence on the shape which our health services take over the next few 
years and decades. In our view this calls for a significant amount of dissemination activity by the 
research community via multiple channels (e.g. discussions at key practitioner events and 
conferences, easily accessible web-based tools in addition to hard copies, and a continued stream of 
publications on efficiency and performance in healthcare) and co-production of knowledge through 
work with local stakeholders to help inform the case for change.  We hope that volumes such as the 
present one can play a useful role in facilitating such discussions. 
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